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Self-control: disentanling inhibition and initiation
Kucharský, Šimon ; Vranka, Marek (advisor) ; Lukavský, Jiří (referee)
Self-control is usually defined as a unit in a regulatory cycle process. As such, it can be used for inhibition of urgent need or overriding impulsive responses, but it can also mean that person can engage in a behavior which is aversive at the moment. Contemporary the most influential is strength model of self-control that envisages one general and limited source of energy for every act of self-control. According to this model, after depleting this energy, one's ability to control his or her behavior or thought is impaired, even in domains that does not relate to the cause of the depletion. However, there has been substantial criticism of this model recently - regarding theoretical implausibility, possible bias in literature (or even manipulated results) and also growing body of evidence that is not in line with the model. Because of that, there are attempts to alter or dismiss the model. One of the possible updates is distinguishing between two domains of self-control (inhibition and initiation). This thesis overviews body of recent findings about self-control and proposes experimental design which could serve to verify hypothesis of existence of two independent domain of self- control. Limits of this approach and suggestions for future research are also discussed. Keywords: Self-control, ego...
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Psychological aspects of evidence assessment
Hurych, Jan ; Kosek, Jan (advisor) ; Agha, Petr (referee)
Psychological aspects of evidence evaluation: Abstract The diploma thesis focuses on the topic of judging and decision-making within the process of evidence evaluation. Its main goal is to identify and describe cognitive illusions which can have a negative impact on the process of evidence evaluation. The mutual position of psychology and law in also considered within introductory chapters. The decision making of the judges is initially described by theoretical models. Three cognitive illusions that are essential for evidence evaluation are described in the following chapter. It is anchoring heuristic, hindsight bias and confirmation bias. Eventually risks, which these cognitive illusions represent for evidence evaluation, are described and forms of countermeasures are discussed. One chapter of the thesis is devoted to the description of ego depletion, which could pose another limit for the process of evidence evaluation. Ego depletion describes decline of self-control in cases which demand conscious effort. The judges are probably in a risk of ego depletion. This phenomenon can lead to higher vulnerability towards cognitive illusions and stronger tendency to maintain status quo. Possible countermeasures are described and discussed on one hand against anchoring, hindsight and confirmation bias and on the...
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Self-control: disentanling inhibition and initiation
Kucharský, Šimon ; Vranka, Marek (advisor) ; Lukavský, Jiří (referee)
Self-control is usually defined as a unit in a regulatory cycle process. As such, it can be used for inhibition of urgent need or overriding impulsive responses, but it can also mean that person can engage in a behavior which is aversive at the moment. Contemporary the most influential is strength model of self-control that envisages one general and limited source of energy for every act of self-control. According to this model, after depleting this energy, one's ability to control his or her behavior or thought is impaired, even in domains that does not relate to the cause of the depletion. However, there has been substantial criticism of this model recently - regarding theoretical implausibility, possible bias in literature (or even manipulated results) and also growing body of evidence that is not in line with the model. Because of that, there are attempts to alter or dismiss the model. One of the possible updates is distinguishing between two domains of self-control (inhibition and initiation). This thesis overviews body of recent findings about self-control and proposes experimental design which could serve to verify hypothesis of existence of two independent domain of self- control. Limits of this approach and suggestions for future research are also discussed. Keywords: Self-control, ego...
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Vliv kognitivního vyčerpání na rozhodování
Farská, Kateřina ; Houdek, Petr (advisor) ; Rusina, Robert (referee)
One of the factors significantly influencing our daily decisions is the so-called cognitive depletion.The theory of cognitive depletion postulates the existence of a limited mental resource that is necessary for self-regulation. If the resource is diminished by a task involving self-control, achievement in subsequent self-control task will be impaired. This project examines the effect of cognitive depletion on decisions in the Iowa Gambling Task designed to simulate real-life decision making involving gains and losses. Further, a possible effect of moderating factors that could be affected by cognitive depletion and consequently influence decisions in the Iowa Gambling Task -- risk preference and impulsivity -- is investigated. Dual-process theories postulate there are two systems involved in decision-making: faster, intuitive, emotional System 1 and slower, deliberative, rational System 2. It was found that cognitive depletion leads to enhancement of System 1. As advantageous decisions in the Iowa Gambling Task are closely related to emotional reactions -- domain of System 1 -- it was hypothesized that cognitive depletion will lead to not worse, or possibly even better results in depleted subjects. A controlled laboratory experiment was conducted involving 39 subjects in total. No difference was found in average desicions of depleted and non-depleted subjects in the Iowa Gambling Task, supporting the hypothesis. Further, short-term increase in impulsivity caused by cognitive depletion was very probably moderating choices in the IGT, leading to worse overall performance. Regarding risk preferences, we found that non-depleted subjects were generally more risk seeking in losses context, while depleted subjects exhibited rather loss aversion. This change in risk behaviors due to cognitive depletion very probably did not mediate choices in the Iowa Gambling Task.
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